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EXIT, NO EXIT 
BARBARA KOREMENOS* AND ALLISON NAU** 
INTRODUCTION 
Is international law rationally designed? That is, can we make sense of 
all the detailed provisions that make up the typical international agreement, 
features like duration provisions, escape clauses, the precision or vagueness 
of an agreement’s main goals, or even withdrawal provisions? Do such 
provisions vary systematically in a way that makes sense given the 
problems states are trying to resolve by making international law? 
Treaty design is a topic that has been the object of much research by 
legal scholars, but that has garnered relatively little attention from students 
of international relations (“IR”).1 Over the past decade, however, a 
resurgence of interest in international law has led many from the IR field to 
consider seriously the implications of the specific legal provisions that are 
inscribed in international agreements.2 This Article contributes to the 
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 1. See, e.g., Francois S. Jones, Treaties and Treaty-Making, 12 POL. SCI. Q. 381, 420-49 (1897); 
Robert R. Wilson, Revision Clauses in Treaties Since the World War, 28 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 807, 901–
09 (1934). 
 2. See Barbara Koremenos, Contracting around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 473, 549-65 (2005) (arguing that finite duration provisions allow states to contract in the presence 
of uncertainty because they allow for adjustment or termination if the agreement does not work as 
anticipated); B. Peter V. Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade 
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 829-57 (2001) (arguing that international 
institutions are likely to be more durable and stable when they include an escape clause in the design). 
See generally BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS (2009) (arguing that states observe better human rights practices after they ratify human rights 
treaties because ratification empowers domestic groups, and that this remains true across domains 
ranging from women’s rights to civil rights to children’s rights); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of 
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (2002) (arguing that specialized domestic agencies, particularly those geared towards 
regulation, can enhance domestic compliance with international treaties). 
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ongoing discussion between the legal and the political science communities 
by offering a theoretical argument and large-n empirical analysis3 of the 
factors that condition the design of an important feature of international 
agreements: withdrawal clauses.4  
 Building on earlier theoretical developments,5 we explain how the 
inclusion of withdrawal clauses, and how their specific form, should be 
understood as a rational response to the strategic environment in which 
states hope to cooperate. We contend that under certain conditions, a 
“quick withdrawal” could offer a strategic advantage to the withdrawing 
state. In game theory, this is equivalent to the high payoff a state receives 
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type game when other states cooperate while it 
defects.6 Even though withdrawing is lawful and not equivalent to 
defecting in that sense,7 strategically, withdrawing has the same effect as 
defecting: The state that is no longer abiding by the terms of the agreement 
gains while the states left cooperating lose. We argue that states can solve 
this strategic problem with a withdrawal provision that includes a notice 
period and that this notice period is likely to be long. The longer notice 
 
 3. A large-n analysis is a systematic statistical study of a population of cases, in this case, a large 
dataset of international agreements. See generally Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that large-n statistical analysis of a scientific random sample of 
international agreements allows inferences from this set of agreements to a much wider-range of cases). 
This method of large-n research is in contrast to the use of descriptive inference, as commonly used in 
legal scholarship, where scholars unscientifically generalize about the world from empirically 
examining small parts of it. See id. at 30 (arguing that inference from large-n work—as commonly 
applied in scientific studies in the natural and social sciences—adds accuracy and depth to legal 
scholarship). 
 4. In this paper, we follow Helfer in using the terms ‘exit,’ ‘denunciation,’ and ‘withdrawal’ 
interchangeably. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005). 
 5. Rational Design theory is elaborated in detail below. See infra Part II; see also Barbara 
Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 
INT’L ORG. 761 (2001). 
 6. Game theory allows us to analyze outcomes that result from strategic interactions between 
actors. For instance, the Prisoner’s Dilemma models a 2-by-2 game, that is, a two player, two option 
matrix, where two prisoners are taken to different rooms by cops who visit each prisoner separately. 
Either prisoner can give evidence to convict the other. If neither testifies against the other, they will 
both be convicted only of a very minor crime, say a one-year sentence. If Prisoner 1 testifies against 
Prisoner 2 but Prisoner 2 remains silent, Prisoner 2 gets a tough sentence, say ten years, and Prisoner 1 
goes free and vice versa. If both testify against the other, both get a sentence of five years. Each 
prisoner makes a strategic decision, without knowing how the other prisoner will act, about whether or 
not to testify based on a “dominant” strategy. Regardless of whether or not the other prisoner testifies, it 
is in each prisoner’s interest to testify because he will receive a lower sentence in the event that the 
other prisoner testifies or in the event that the other prisoner stays quiet. But when both prisoners act 
rationally and testify against the other, they receive sentences of five years each; if they went against 
their self interest and remained quiet, they would receive only one year sentences, hence the dilemma. 
See ROBERT AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 8 (2006). 
 7. See generally Helfer, supra note 4. 
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period levels the playing field for all states, reducing fear that the 
remaining states would be taken advantage of and eliminating one of the 
advantages to withdrawing. In this way, including a withdrawal provision 
with a notice period actually results in states being more willing to 
cooperate in the first place since their fear of opportunistic behavior on the 
part of their partners is reduced, and it makes cooperation more robust 
since withdrawing will occur less often once one of the advantages to 
withdrawing is reduced. 
We also argue that when states face domestic commitment or time 
inconsistency problems, that is, when tying their hands is in their self 
interest in the long run but often politically difficult in the short run, they 
write agreements that include withdrawal provisions with wait periods (the 
amount of time that a state must wait before even giving notice of the intent 
to withdraw) and that this wait period is likely to be long. Such provisions 
help the state with the commitment problem solve its challenge and help 
assure its partner states that it is indeed a credible partner in cooperation. 
The next section of this paper puts the functions of exit clauses in a 
broader theoretical perspective by focusing on Laurence Helfer’s article 
about exit provisions. We proceed by introducing the “Rational Design” 
theoretical framework to the law community, highlighting how it can shed 
light on the topic at hand.8 We then present our theoretical hypotheses, 
introduce the data from the Continent of International Law (“COIL”), a 
research project which aims to assemble detailed information on a large 
random sample of international agreements across the issue areas of 
economics, environment, human rights, and security,9 and display the 
results of empirical testing. The results strongly support the hypotheses. 
We conclude that exit clauses are indeed rationally designed, thus 
corroborating their significance as well as the meaningfulness and 
rationality of international law more generally. 
I. EXIT CLAUSES IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The process of negotiating treaty provisions is costly. If we assume 
that the signatory parties are rational actors, it follows that withdrawal 
clauses must be beneficial, or they would not appear in agreements. 
However, because states are sovereign actors, and given that there exists no 
centralized mechanism for the enforcement of international agreements, 
 
 8. See Koremenos et al., supra note 5, at 761 and accompanying pieces in the 2001 International 
Organization special issue on Rational Design. 
 9. See generally Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law (Mannheimer Zentrum 
für Europäische Sozialforschung [Mannheim Centre for European Social Research],Working Paper No. 
128, 2009) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-128.pdf. 
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states retain the ability to unilaterally (and illegally) defect from the 
agreements they conclude. This suggests two interesting puzzles: First, why 
would states codify practices that are already enabled by the anarchic 
nature of the international system?10 Second, what can account for the wide 
variations in the design of exit clauses? 
In his 2005 article Exiting Treaties,11 Laurence Helfer answers the 
first question and makes an important contribution by highlighting the very 
different consequences that ensue from a unilateral and unlawful breach of 
treaty obligations, relative to a public and lawful exit of one of the parties. 
First, noncompliance12 does not “necessarily result in termination of 
the defaulting state’s membership.” In contrast, a state that exits a treaty is 
“foreclosed from the mechanisms of voice that the treaty establishes, 
mechanisms that can be used to influence both the parties’ current behavior 
as well as future rounds of international rulemaking.”13 Not only do 
withdrawing states lose voice, but they can also be excluded from the 
benefits that accrue from membership.14 
Second, a state which denounces a treaty in a lawful and public 
manner cannot be exposed to intra-treaty sanctions. Other signatories 
cannot use the treaty’s enforcement mechanism to punish or encourage 
certain types of behavior on the part of the withdrawing state. Lawful exit 
may also affect other states’ ability to legitimize the use of extra-treaty 
sanctions.15 
 
 10. In Koremenos et al., the Rational Design framework is presented in explicit contrast to earlier 
work in the IR literature on cooperation under anarchy. The traditional view is that institutions 
generally play a modest role in international politics. From our perspective however, decentralized 
cooperation is difficult, but states can and do use institutions to eschew the strategic problems that are 
caused by the absence of centralized enforcement mechanisms. See Koremenos et al., supra note 5 
(reviewing the literature and providing a thorough exposition of our views on the topic). 
 11. Helfer, supra note 4. 
 12. As Helfer points out, “breaches are highly varied. They may affect only a single treaty article, 
a handful of obligations, or the entire treaty.” The argument put forth above holds regardless of the 
extent of the breach. See id. at 1614. 
 13. Id. at 1613. 
 14. Id. at 1621. The ability to exclude a withdrawing partner from the benefits of a treaty depends 
on the type of goods that are generated by it. In the case of private or club goods, exclusion is possible; 
in the case of public goods, which are non-rival and non-excludable, it is impossible to prevent a state 
that exits from free-riding on the contributions of the members that remain. On the collective action 
problem that arises when actors attempt to coordinate for the production of public goods, see generally 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (arguing that when a public good is 
provided by a set of actors, others will “free ride” unless the good is provided to only those actors who 
are active participants in the provision of the good). On the related problem of managing shared 
resources, see generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990) (detailing how in the face 
of temptations to free-ride, designing durable institutions of cooperation can resolve a “tragedy of the 
commons”). 
 15. Helfer, supra note 5, at 1616-17. 
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Finally, Helfer argues that “[t]he choice to denounce, together with 
any explanation the state offers to justify its decision, may signal an intent 
to ‘play by the rules’ of future treaties as well. As a result, harm to the 
withdrawing state’s reputation as a law abiding nation may be minimal.”16 
In sum, Helfer shows that the breach of treaty obligations and the 
complete withdrawal of a state yield different payoffs; the presence of an 
exit clause in a treaty alters the incentive structure that states face when 
they weigh the costs and benefits of cooperation versus defection. From 
this vantage point, Helfer criticizes the extant international relations 
literature by arguing that it has largely neglected the exit option by forcing 
the real world into 2-by-2 games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma. According to 
Helfer, future research should thus expand the range of available strategies 
for the players.17 Analysts should also consider the interaction of problem 
structure, externalities, and exit clauses.18 
We take seriously Helfer’s call for an examination of the interaction of 
problem structure and exit clauses. What is needed to move forward is an 
approach that is internally consistent and based on solid micro-
foundations.19 As we show below, the Rational Design project, which 
indeed moves away from 2-by-2 games, begins to respond to this need. 
II. THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS20 
The starting point for Rational Design is a very simple observation: 
institutionalized international cooperation is organized in radically different 
ways. Institutionalized international cooperation (what political scientists 
call “international institutions”) is defined as explicit arrangements—
negotiated among international actors—that prescribe, proscribe, and/or 
authorize behavior. This includes the tens of thousands of international 
agreements that are registered with the United Nations (“UN”). But what is 
 
 16. In his article, Helfer offers a more nuanced version of this general argument, by highlighting 
the importance of three variables on the reputational consequences of exit: “(1) the frequency of 
denunciation and withdrawal; (2) the relationship between entering and exiting treaties; (3) the risks of 
opportunism in light of the pervasive uncertainty of international affairs.” See id. at 1622. 
 17. Helfer considers the potential implications of extending the range of options to three in 
collaboration and coordination games, but does not offer a serious game-theoretic treatment of the 
question. Id. at 1629–36. 
 18. Id. at 1636-39. 
 19. By micro-foundations, we mean that the primary unit of analysis is the individual state and the 
preferences it holds as well as the constraints it faces. Collective outcomes of interest are derived from 
individual states interacting strategically. This is opposed to a sociological approach, for example, 
where the unit of analysis is the collective and what is studied is how the collective—for example, a set 
of norms—influences the individual states. 
 20. This section draws heavily on Koremenos et al., supra note 6, and Barbara Koremenos, 
Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility, 55 INT’L ORG. 289 (2001). 
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really important about the Rational Design agenda is the following 
theoretical premise: We cannot understand institutional design and 
compare across institutions/agreements without understanding the 
cooperation problem(s) the institutions are trying to solve. 
Consider a comparison of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”) with the European Union (“EU”). Certain scholars and 
policymakers contemplated a NAFTA that more closely resembled the EU. 
Yet before we can compare the two to determine whether NAFTA 
somehow falls short, we have to consider the cooperation problems faced 
by the various actors when these institutions, including their predecessors, 
were concluded. The cooperation problems Europeans faced when the 
institutions of the EU began to form in post-World War II were far more 
dramatic than those ever facing North America. North America and Europe 
both wanted to cooperate over trade and hence faced the common 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-like incentives to defect. In addition, however, the 
Europeans faced a unique problem concerning Germany that could be 
characterized either as a significant Uncertainty about Preferences21 (Could 
Germany be trusted? Was Germany indeed a peace-loving state or would it 
end up going down the same path that brought about two World Wars?), or 
as a commitment problem,22 when an actor’s optimal plan today may not be 
optimal at a future point in time (Was it just a matter of time before some 
future German leader follows the destructive path of the past?). Given that 
the Europeans had to solve either Uncertainty about Preferences or a 
commitment problem, the institutional design of the EU would likely be 
more elaborate than that called for by the North American environment. 
Because we cannot understand institutional design and compare and 
contrast international agreements without understanding the cooperation 
problem(s) the agreements are trying to solve, it can be implied that 
differences among international institutions or agreements are not random. 
Rather, states and other international actors shape institutions to solve the 
specific cooperation problems that they face. In other words, design 
variations are largely the result of rational, purposeful interactions. The 
goal of Rational Design is to offer a systematic account of these design 
features, relating them to recurrent problems faced by states.23 
 
 21. This is one of the independent variables in the Rational Design framework, which is 
elaborated below. See infra Part IV. 
 22. This, too, is one of the independent variables in the Rational Design framework, which is 
elaborated below. See infra Part IV. 
 23. In game theory terms, effective international institutions are aspects of stable equilibria. 
Hence, they must be incentive-compatible and robust against small perturbations. Another way of 
thinking about this is to say that rational institutional design allows states to reach more efficient 
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Rational Design focuses on five key dimensions of international 
institutions—the dependent variables.24 These are listed below. 
Membership rules (MEMBERSHIP) 
Scope of issues covered (SCOPE) 
Centralization of tasks (CENTRALIZATION) 
Rules for controlling the institution (CONTROL) 
Flexibility of arrangements (FLEXIBILITY) 
These are not the only dimensions of institutions, but these are among 
the most important. These different dependent variables capture important 
variations in the design of international agreements. The first dependent 
variable, MEMBERSHIP,25 captures who is included in the agreement: is 
the membership designed to be restrictive or all-inclusive? These concepts 
are not to be confused with the actual number of actors involved in the 
institution. Whereas NAFTA has a small number of states, it is 
institutionally less restrictive than the EU. EU members must institute low 
budget deficits and criteria for human rights. The EU is thus a much more 
costly institution to join than NAFTA. 
The second dependent variable, SCOPE,26 details which issues will be 
addressed in the agreement. In some cases this refers to a single issue area, 
as in which kind of military arms are subject to the agreement, in other 
cases, this refers to whether trade issues will be linked to security issues. 
The third dependent variable, CENTRALIZATION,27 details which 
tasks will be required to achieve cooperation, and how they will be 
delegated. Whereas some tasks such as information collection, rule-
making, reviews, monitoring and dispute settlement can be centralized, 
others cannot. This concept is among the more controversial design 
elements, as it touches directly on national sovereignty. States are reluctant 
to delegate authority since they thereby lose at least some control over the 
outcome. In other words, delegation introduces risk. 
CONTROL28 is the fourth dependent variable and it measures how 
collective decisions will be made within the institutional arrangement. For 
example, do the voting rules imply equal votes for each or a veto for a 
minority? This variable addresses how members will make decisions. 
 
cooperative equilibria and helps stabilize these equilibrium outcomes. Koremenos et al., supra note 5, at 
761-63. 
 24. Dependent variables and their definitions were first introduced in id. at 768-69. 
 25. Id. at 770. 
 26. Id.at 770-71. 
 27. Id. at 771-72. 
 28. Id. at 772. 
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Because withdrawal clauses are a form of flexibility, further 
elaboration of this dependent variable is appropriate. FLEXIBILITY29 
speaks to how the institutional rules and procedures will accommodate new 
or changed circumstances. Included in this are not only things like duration 
and renegotiation provisions, escape and withdrawal clauses, and 
amendment provisions, but also the degree of precision as well as 
reservations. 
As part of the Rational Design argument, Koremenos et al. further 
argue that variation in institutional design—that is, variation in the 
dependent variables—is explained by the underlying cooperation problems 
states are facing when designing their agreements: the independent 
variables.30 Instead of using a typology of games, Rational Design calls for 
the disaggregation of cooperation problems. Fundamentally, states 
potentially face Distribution problems (which refer to the different 
preferences that actors have over alternative possible agreements) and 
enforcement problems (which refer to the incentives actors have to break 
an agreement). These are then shaped by various degrees of Uncertainty 
about Preferences (that is, uncertainty regarding what one’s partners’ 
preferences are), Uncertainty about Behavior (not being able to decipher 
easily whether partners are cooperating or defecting), and Uncertainty 
about the State of the World (that is, uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of cooperation).31 Finally, the Number of Actors and 
asymmetries or heterogeneity among them affect the nature of the 
cooperation problem. Considering these factors independently allows for a 
treatment of their univariate effects on important features of potential 
institutions and hence gets around the problem of forcing real-life issues 
into 2-by-2 games. 
Rational Design offers a set of conjectures linking one cooperation 
problem with one institutional design solution.32 While we will not 
replicate the list of conjectures here, we will give a few examples from the 
Rational Design introduction. Of the sixteen univariate Rational Design 
conjectures relating one independent variable to one dependent variable, 
three conjectures involve the dependent variable, flexibility. Two of the 
three stipulate some aspect of the cooperation problem the states are facing 
 
 29. Id. at 773. 
 30. The independent variables were first presented and elaborated in Koremenos et al., supra note 
6, at 773–75. 
 31. These cooperation problems are elaborated in great detail in Barbara Koremenos, 
International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation (Institut Barcelona 
d’Estudis Internacionals, Working Paper 2009/27, 2009). 
 32. See Koremenos et al., supra note 5, at 780. 
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as the independent variable: “Flexibility increases with Uncertainty about 
the State of the World”33 and “Flexibility increases with the Severity of the 
Distribution Problem.”34 The third conjecture pertains to transaction 
costs—”Flexibility decreases with Number”35—where number can capture 
the literal number of states and/or their heterogeneity.36 
To illustrate the intuition underlying the relevant Rational Design 
conjectures, consider the hypothesis that as a certain kind of uncertainty 
increases, states will design agreements to allow for more flexibility in the 
institutional rules: “Flexibility increases with Uncertainty about the State of 
the World.” International cooperation is plagued by uncertainty. While 
states negotiate the best agreements possible using available information, 
unpredictable things happen after agreements are signed that are beyond 
states’ control. States may not even commit themselves to an agreement if 
they anticipate circumstances will alter their expected benefits. Certain 
flexibility provisions, like duration clauses, can insure states in this context. 
Ex ante, all parties would agree to such a clause in the face of the 
uncertainty problem since each one is under the veil of ignorance about 
who might gain or lose more than anticipated. 
What does a variable like uncertainty about the state of the world look 
like in real life? The best place to start the process of operationalizing and 
measuring a challenging variable is through some research, which allows 
one to understand the meaning of the variable in important, real-life cases. 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“NPT”) is one such case.37 
In Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement 
Flexibility, Koremenos discusses the negotiating process of the NPT and 
the potential underlying reasoning for such debate.38 It turns out that 
choosing the duration and renegotiation provisions of the NPT provoked an 
intense debate. The treaty negotiations lasted from 1962 to 1968. As late as 
1967, the United States and the Soviet Union (the original drafters) were 
pressing for a treaty with an unlimited duration while the Germans and the 
Italians were emphasizing the impossibility of accepting such duration. As 
the Italian representative to the negotiating committee, Caraciollo, stated: 
 
 33. Id. at 793-94. 
 34. Id. at 794. 
 35. Id.at 794-95. 
 36. Heterogeneity can mean different things in different contexts. For instance, in a security 
agreement, the meaningful heterogeneity might be between those possessing nuclear weapons or those 
not, or the dispersion of military power overall; in an economic agreement, the wealth or economic 
system of the set of states might be the relevant measure, while in human rights agreements, the wider 
the cultural divides, the greater the heterogeneity. 
 37. This example draws directly on ideas first discussed in Koremenos, supra note 20, at 304. 
 38. Id. at 305-08. 
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“. . . it is not the lot of man, to pledge eternity. Moreover, if we look back 
across our thousands of years of history, we see very few non-institutional 
treaties that have simply survived the vicissitudes of one generation, let 
alone achieved immortality. Therefore we fear that to affirm a principle so 
remote from reality may introduce into the treaty an element of weakness 
rather than of strength.”39 
Hence the uncertainty about the state of the world was too high to 
make non-nuclear weapon states comfortable accepting an indefinitely long 
agreement. What did this uncertainty look like in real life? First, there were 
uncertainties surrounding the security consequences of the treaty. These 
included uncertainty about the effort that the nuclear weapon states would 
put into nuclear disarmament, uncertainties about extended deterrence, and 
uncertainties about which countries would end up participating in the 
regime. 
Second, there were uncertainties surrounding the economic 
consequences of the treaty. These included whether the treaty might restrict 
non-nuclear weapon states’ ability to make peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
how economically costly the International Atomic Energy Agency 
monitoring would turn out to be, and whether states that were not parties to 
the treaty might be able to obtain nuclear technology with fewer restrictions 
than signatory states. 
Third, there were uncertainties surrounding the political consequences 
of the treaty. In particular, Italy worried that the distribution of gains from 
the NPT would skew the distribution of power in Europe in ways that 
would make European integration difficult if not impossible. 
Essentially, this great uncertainty about the state of the world—that is, 
uncertainty about how the agreement would turn out in terms of its 
distribution of costs and benefits—forced the Soviet Union and the United 
States to compromise their desire for an indefinite agreement. What 
resulted from the negotiations was a twenty-five year duration agreement, 
with reviews every five years. The institutional design choice of flexibility 
helped states solve the cooperation problem. 
Every Rational Design conjecture has game-theoretic underpinnings. 
As an example, it might be helpful to elaborate the theory informing this 
particular Rational Design conjecture of “Flexibility increases with 
Uncertainty about the State of the World.” 
The conjecture has its origins in work in economics, especially, 
contract theory. Economists have long recognized the importance of 
 
 39. U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Statement by the Italian Representative 
(Caracciolo) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, DOC. ON DISARMAMENT, 1967, at 528. 
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flexibility. Two particularly important papers that have theorized it are 
Gray40 and Harris and Holmstrom.41 The Gray paper grew out of attempts 
to model the role of incomplete contracts42 at the microeconomic level in 
bringing about sticky wages at the macroeconomic level.43 In the Harris 
and Holmstrom model, renegotiation is synonymous with paying a cost to 
learn the true value of the underlying state of the world variable. In both 
models of contract duration, the fundamental tradeoff is between the 
frequency with which the contracting costs are paid and the disutility of 
having a contract whose terms do not correspond well to the realized state 
of the world. 
As Rational Design would predict, states do indeed routinely 
introduce flexibility mechanisms in their international agreements in order 
to cope with uncertainty. Koremenos and Helfer argue that such provisions 
act as an insurance policy, allowing states to conclude more agreements in 
the first place, negotiate more expansive or deeper substantive, 
commitments, and keep their agreements longer without defecting.44 Kucik 
and Reinhardt use an innovative research design to determine whether or 
not the ability to temporarily suspend trade concessions improves the 
likelihood that states will sign trade agreements.45 
Connecting uncertainty and exit clauses, Helfer states: “Uncertainty is 
a pervasive feature of international affairs. Denunciation clauses reduce 
uncertainty by giving states a low cost exit option if an agreement turns out 
badly. All other things being equal, such clauses encourage the ratification 
 
 40. See generally Jo Anna Gray, On Indexation and Contract Length, 86 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1978). 
 41. See generally Milton Harris & Bengt Holstrom, On the Duration of Agreements, 26 INT’L 
ECON. REV. 389 (1987). 
 42. Incomplete contracts are drawn out because parties face uncertainty about the future when 
designing a contract and detailing each contingency for all possible outcomes is impossible. See 
generally Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC 
THEORY 71, 71–155 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987) (arguing that with transaction costs, incomplete 
contracts are necessary because the costs of making agreements completely contingent are too high for 
the parties to choose to do so). 
 43. Gray's analysis illustrates the important general point that in the absence of some costs of 
contracting, contracts would always be written to end whenever new information arrives so that a new 
contract could be concluded that incorporates the new information. In contrast, in the presence of fixed 
costs to contracting (these costs may result from, for example, the costs of negotiation), there is a 
tradeoff between contracting costs and the divergence between the actual contract parameters and those 
that are optimal for the (evolving) state of the world. Gray's model embodies this fundamental tradeoff. 
She examines the choice of the optimal duration (and level of indexing) for a single contract given this 
tradeoff. Gray, supra note 40, at 7. 
 44. See generally Koremenos, supra note 20; Helfer, supra note 4. 
 45. Jeffrey Kucik & Eric Reinhardt, Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the 
Global Trade Regime, 62 Int’l Org 477, 499-500 (2008) (arguing that states that incorporate flexibility 
through the use of antidumping mechanisms are more likely to commit to binding trade agreements). 
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of a treaty by a larger number of states than would be prepared to ratify in 
the absence of such a clause.”46 
Koremenos refines this particular statement with an analysis that 
connects particular kinds of flexibility mechanisms with distinctive kinds 
of uncertainty. Koremenos provides a formal model of duration clauses and 
argues that that type of flexibility is the superior or optimal response to the 
kind of uncertainty the Helfer quote describes: the uncertainty surrounding 
how an agreement may turn out. 
What is it that makes a finite duration with the possibility of 
renegotiation uniquely important in this context? This particular 
institutional design allows adjustment in the face of international 
uncertainty without dismantling cooperation.47 Why should states 
contemplate complete withdrawal when they can instead renegotiate or 
amend an agreement so that the agreement can then accommodate the 
difficult-to-predict experience of the states? A systematic statistical study 
using a large dataset of international agreements—a large-n empirical 
analysis—allows us to understand whether or not Koremenos’ conjectures 
about these variables are correct. In using this kind of statistical analysis, 
she can confirm that duration provisions are indeed used for this purpose.48 
Koremenos analyzes both escape clauses (often called derogation clauses) 
and withdrawal clauses to see if they are substitutes for limited duration 
provisions as a response to this kind of uncertainty. They are not. Escape 
clauses do not permit adjustment; rather, they allow states to temporarily 
escape cooperation and return to an unadjusted agreement. Escape clauses 
are, however, appropriate responses to domestic uncertainty. States may 
agree to particular terms of cooperation but then suffer domestic shocks 
that make these terms politically difficult. What they require then is a 
temporary relief from their obligations. Even the typical wording of escape 
clauses suggests this purpose: “extraordinary circumstances that jeopardize 
extreme national interests.” Human rights agreements contain significantly 
more escape clauses than agreements in other issue areas, with the 
domestic shock usually being civil war. Article 4 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states “[i]n time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation . . . [states] may take 
measures derogating from their obligations under the [agreement] to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”49 If a state takes 
 
 46. Helfer, supra note 4, at 1599. 
 47. Koremenos, supra note 2, at 561. 
 48. Id. at 560. 
 49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
174. 
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such measures, it must inform other state parties through the Secretary-
General of the UN regarding “the provisions from which it has derogated 
and of the reasons by which it was actuated.”50 
Withdrawal clauses are also very different from duration provisions 
because cooperative institutions cease to exist in the bilateral cases (by far, 
the majority) or the membership changes in a multilateral setting. The latter 
can be quite consequential: when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, the agreement remained intact, yet the 
implications of the membership change were serious. Koremenos argues 
that withdrawal clauses are responses to shocks that alter a state’s basic 
interest in cooperation. Although such shocks occur less frequently than 
unpredicted outcomes or domestic shocks, the risk they impose is great. 
Therefore, we might expect that states will more often than not include 
withdrawal provisions in their agreements. The relationship between 
“bedrock” preferences, which are fundamentally stable, and constraints, 
which arise from the fact that the state is a composite actor, also provides 
insight.51 Withdrawal clauses are used in the event of “bedrock” changes 
while escape clauses are used in the event of unchanged bedrock 
preferences but different domestic constraints.52 
Using a random sample of agreements, Koremenos finds that 62 
percent of the agreements have withdrawal provisions and about 8 percent 
have escape clauses, but the correlation among these variables and duration 
provisions never exceeds 0.18.53 Flexibility provisions are not simply 
chosen as a set; nor do particular pairs go together. The problems these 
provisions uniquely solve occur in different combinations depending on the 
cooperative endeavor. The conclusion to be drawn is that the landscape of 
international law is far from crude.54 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncon Snidal, Rational Design: Looking Back to 
Move Forward, 55 INT’L ORG. 1051, 1073 (2001). 
 52. Koremenos, supra note 2. 
 53. Id. at 561. 
 54. Although escape and withdrawal clauses seem to solve different problems than finite duration, 
there is another design tool that allows adjustment in the face of shocks: an agreement embodying a 
quasi-legislative institution with the power to modify the distribution of gains. The International 
Monetary Fund provides a good example of an indefinite duration agreement that establishes an 
institution that does many things including, importantly, adjusting the distribution of gains. Koremenos 
(2000) argues that such a design may be optimal when uncertainty regarding future gains is pervasive, 
but renegotiation costs are high because of the number of parties involved. In this context, an institution 
with an amendment provision characterized by majority rule cuts down on adjustment costs relative to a 
full renegotiation. See Barbara Koremenos, Bending but Not Breaking: Flexibility in International 
Financial and Monetary Agreements, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley: Ctr. for German and European Studies, 
Working Paper 1.73, 2000). 
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III. A THEORY OF EXIT CLAUSE DESIGN 
Focusing on exit clauses, we observe a high degree of variation in the 
substantive legal provisions that compose them. Helfer uses the handbook 
provided by the United Nations55 that many international lawyers reference 
and finds that: 
[W]ithdrawal clauses cluster around six ideal types: (1) treaties that 
may be denounced at any time; (2) treaties that preclude denunciation 
for a fixed number of years, calculated either from the date the 
agreement enters into force or from the date of ratification by the state; 
(3) treaties that permit denunciation only at fixed time intervals; (4) 
treaties that may be denounced only on a single occasion, identified 
either by time period or upon the occurrence of a particular event; (5) 
treaties whose denunciation occurs automatically upon the state’s 
ratification of a subsequently-negotiated agreement; and (6) treaties 
that are silent as to denunciation or withdrawal.56 
Data from COIL, elaborated below, also highlights the wide 
substantive differences in exit clauses. The majority of exit clauses take the 
form of categories 1, 2, and 6 above, but a few agreements from the 
random sample are characterized by categories 3, 4, and 5. The theoretical 
and empirical work presented below focuses on two dimensions of this 
variation: the length of the notice period, if any, that states are required to 
give before exiting a treaty (“notice period”), and the length of time that 
has to elapse between treaty ratification and a state being completely freed 
of its obligations (“wait period”). Each of these is discussed in detail 
below. 
 
 55. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, FINAL CLAUSES OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
HANDBOOK, UN Sales No E.04.V.3 (2003). 
 56. Helfer, supra note 4, at 1597. There subsists a doctrinal debate about whether or not “silent” 
treaties preclude exit altogether. On the one hand, the principle of state sovereignty may imply that 
states automatically reserve the right to withdraw from a treaty, even if the text does not include a 
denunciation clause. On the other, omitting to include such a clause might suggest that the signatory 
parties intend to make a treaty permanent (e.g. in high stakes issue areas such as peace agreements). A 
widely used approach to this question is set forth in Article 56 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties: “A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide 
for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) [i]t is established 
that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) [a] right of 
denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties art. 56(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. For brief overviews of this question, see John 
Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal from International Court of Justice Jurisdiction in Consular 
Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 263, 291-92 (2008); Helfer, supra 
note 4, at 1593–94, 97. 
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A. Notice Period 
A notice period is the amount of time between the point at which a 
member gives notice of its withdrawal and the point at which its 
withdrawal becomes effective. There is tremendous variation in the length 
of the notice period states are required to give before exiting a treaty. 
What explains the inclusion and length of the notice period? 
Following Rational Design, we can ask, what strategic underlying problems 
might cause states to want a longer notice period? If states were required to 
modify domestic policies as a treaty enters into force, they would likely 
have to change domestic policies again to accommodate for the change in 
circumstances caused by the withdrawal of another state from the treaty. 
Agreements based on reciprocal behavior would require a change in 
domestic policy for all parties if one state withdrew from the agreement.57 
A notice period would allow signatory states to adjust their own policies 
prior to the withdrawal of an individual state. This period of time to adjust 
policies is particularly important when states face an enforcement problem. 
An enforcement problem is present when actors have incentives to 
defect from cooperation. Even if a cooperative arrangement makes 
everyone better off, some or all actors may prefer not to adhere to it 
because they can do better individually by cheating. Issues are 
characterized by enforcement problems when actors find current, unilateral 
noncooperation so enticing that they sacrifice long-term cooperation. This, 
of course, is the predicament of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
public goods problems.58 At one extreme are cases with no enforcement 
problem: When states need to set technical standards, actors will have no 
incentive to defect once such an agreement has been reached. Within the 
context of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games, the enforcement problem 
may be minimal if incentives to defect are small relative to the shadow of 
 
 57. Arms control agreements between superpowers are examples of agreements designed on the 
principle of reciprocal behavior. For instance, in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, both the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. expected that the treaty’s provisions would be upheld by each other. Treaty on the Limitation 
of Anti-Balistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 26 May, 1972, 23 U.S.T.S. 3435. Without reciprocity, 
the legitimacy of the treaty would have been undermined. 
 58. While defecting is the dominant strategy in a one-time play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, once 
the game is repeated, other equilibria emerge. In fact, repeated play often makes possible the Pareto-
efficient equilibrium in which both parties cooperate. Usually, however, this equilibrium is supported 
by a threat, also known as the grim trigger strategy: if one party defects, the other party will start 
defecting and defect forever. Consequently, in this case, both parties lose when one party’s defection is 
followed by another’s, and this threat allows cooperation to continue despite the short-term gain from 
defection. 
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the future.59 But as incentives to defect are greater, or interactions are less 
frequent, enforcement problems emerge. 
The 1925 Convention Concerning Equality of Treatment for National 
and Foreign Workers as Regards Workmen’s Compensation for 
Accidents60 is an example of a human rights agreement61 in which one of 
the underlying cooperation problems is an enforcement problem. The 
enforcement problem is created by the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure of the 
game: A state wants its workers to be treated well in other states, but would 
prefer not to spend resources on foreigners within its borders.62 
Agreements whose goal it is to solve underlying enforcement 
problems may include institutional design features like rewards and 
punishments or dispute resolution provisions to try to change the short-term 
incentives of states to defect. Still, there remains the possibility that a 
“quick withdrawal” could offer a strategic advantage to the withdrawing 
state, in the same way that a “sneak attack” offers an advantage to a state at 
war. It can be assumed that the withdrawing state knows that it wants to 
withdraw before it announces it. If it could withdraw immediately, it could 
have a strategic advantage by surprising other states with the 
announcement since other states would not have had time to accommodate. 
This is equivalent to the high payoff a defecting state receives in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game when others cooperate while it defects. Even 
though withdrawing is lawful and not equivalent to defecting from a strict 
international law standpoint, strategically, withdrawing has the same effect 
as defecting: the state that is no longer abiding by the terms of the 
agreement gains while the states left cooperating lose. In a sense, including 
a notice period levels the playing field for all states, reducing fear that the 
remaining states would be taken advantage of and eliminating the 
advantage to withdrawing. Put differently, a notice period changes the 
 
 59. The shadow of the future is the expectation of benefits from future interaction and their value. 
Thus, a long shadow implies both that actors have a sufficiently high density of interaction and that they 
assign a sufficiently high value to the future. 
 60. Convention Concerning Equality of Treatment for National and Foreign Workers as Regards 
Workmen's Compensation for Accidents, June 5, 1925, 38 U.N.T.S. 257. 
 61. In addition to the “core” multilateral human rights agreements that are very well known (e.g., 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child) the UNTS categorizes a number of bilateral agreements such 
as this one as being in the issue area of human rights, given that the rights of foreign citizens are 
addressed. 
 62. That is, State A would like its workers to be treated well but would prefer not to spend 
resources on State B’s workers. State B feels the same way. However, both State A and State B would 
prefer to both spend resources on each other’s workers than for neither to spend resources. In other 
words, cooperate-cooperate as a strategy pair is Pareto optimal to defect-defect, despite the desire of 
both parties to be the only defector while the other cooperates. This is the essence of a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game structure. 
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nature of the game by precluding the high payoff that comes from 
unilateral defection while another state cooperates. The inclusion of a 
notice period allows the other state the option of ceasing cooperation as 
well. Because what would likely result is the strategy pair defect-defect, 
which is Pareto suboptimal as well as individually inferior to cooperate-
cooperate, all other things equal, states will cease cooperation less often. 
For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis: 
(N-1)63 Ceteris paribus, agreements that are characterized by an 
underlying enforcement problem are more likely to include notice 
periods than those not characterized by an underlying enforcement 
problem. 
Should states choose to include a withdrawal notice period in their 
agreements, the same reasoning applies to the length of the notice period. 
When states fear a bad payoff from another state’s withdrawal because of 
the underlying strategic structure of the situation in which they are 
cooperating, they will want greater warning time to be able to adjust their 
policies. 
For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis: 
(N-2) Ceteris paribus, if the parties conclude an agreement with a 
notice period, those agreements that are characterized by an underlying 
enforcement problem are more likely to feature longer notice periods 
than those not characterized by an underlying enforcement problem. 
Thus, an underlying enforcement problem leads states to include a 
notice period, but we do not claim that this is the only factor states 
consider. In other words, we are not offering a complete theory of notice 
periods. Once states decide to include a notice period, the same underlying 
enforcement problem leads them to make the notice period longer. 
B. Withdrawal Waiting Period 
Another very important design element of some withdrawal provisions 
is what we label the withdrawal waiting period. A withdrawal waiting 
period is the designated period of time before a member that wants to 
withdraw from the agreement is fully freed from its commitments under the 
agreement. Some agreements specify a certain amount of time that member 
states must remain bound by the agreement before they are even allowed to 
give notice to withdraw. Additionally, while members are usually freed 
from their commitments on withdrawal, some agreements extend a state’s 
 
 63. N stands for notice period; below, W stands for waiting period. 
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commitments beyond the point of its withdrawal. Bilateral investment 
agreements, for example, usually extend protections for investments that 
were made before notice of termination an additional number of years. The 
withdrawal waiting period can thus include up to three distinct periods: 
first, any period that does not allow withdrawal; second, the withdrawal 
notice period; and third, the length of time that states are bound to an 
agreement’s provisions beyond withdrawal. An agreement may include any 
or all of these periods. The total amount of time between the entry into 
force of the agreement and the full release of member obligation is the 
withdrawal waiting period. 
Consider the 1982 Agreement on the Mutual Protection of 
Investments between Sweden and China.64 Article 9 states: 
(1) This Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon signature. 
(2) This agreement shall remain in force for a period of fifteen years 
and shall continue in force thereafter unless, after the expiry of the 
initial period of fourteen years, either Contracting State notifies in 
writing the other Contracting State of its intention to terminate this 
Agreement. The notice of termination shall become effective one year 
after it has been received by the other Contracting State. 
(3) In respect of investments made prior to the date when the notice of 
termination of this Agreement becomes effective, the provisions of 
articles 1 to 8 shall remain in force for a further period of fifteen years 
from that date.65 
The agreement, therefore, has a thirty-year withdrawal waiting period: 
a minimum of fourteen years initial duration plus a one-year withdrawal 
notice period plus a fifteen-year period of coverage of any investments 
made before notice of termination was given. 
With respect to what kind of strategic problem might call for a 
withdrawal waiting period in the first place, or a longer withdrawal waiting 
period conditional on having one, consider commitment problems or time-
inconsistency problems. Negotiating, ratifying, and complying with 
international agreements often pose heavy initial short-run costs before 
longer-term benefits can be enjoyed. Domestic political pressures may be 
such that certain leaders will want to withdraw because of these short-term 
costs before long-term benefits are realized. 
The tradeoff between short-term costs and long-term gains is not only 
a problem for states vis-à-vis other states, but is also often an issue within a 
 
 64. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, China-Swed. art. 9, Mar. 29, 1982, 1350 
U.N.T.S. 255. This agreement is contained in the random sample used in this study. 
 65. Id. 
KOREMENOS_FMT5.DOC 1/10/2011  9:51:29 AM 
2010] EXIT, NO EXIT 99 
signatory state. A forward-looking leader may want to sign an agreement 
that is unpopular with the domestic audience because of costly 
technological adjustment or some other kind of initial heavy investment, 
but that will reap substantial social welfare-enhancing benefits in the long 
run. Alternatively, a state with high levels of political leadership turnover 
may want to strengthen its credibility. The problem posed by short-term 
losses and long-term gains is very typical of a commitment problem. 
The term commitment problem refers to a domestic commitment 
problem or a time-inconsistency problem. A time-inconsistency problem 
describes a situation in which an actor’s best plan for some future period is 
inconsistent over time. Take the following agreement for which the 
cooperation problem is characterized by a commitment problem: the 1980 
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the 
United Kingdom and Bangladesh.66 Given its tumultuous political history, 
including military coups in the 1970s, Bangladesh has a credibility problem 
regarding the safety of outside investments.67 Hence, it needs to tie its 
hands in the present so that it will not give into pressures to nationalize or 
expropriate outside investments. This is especially important given 
outsiders’ perception of the likelihood of a regime change in Bangladesh; 
potential investors will likely not invest without some credible commitment 
on the part of Bangladesh to uphold its promise. If Bangladesh can 
withstand political pressures to not cooperate regarding protection of 
investments, its long-term credibility will be enhanced and it will attract 
even more investment, which will allow it to reap a steady flow of benefits. 
In addition, because an early withdrawal by one state reduces the 
payoffs to the remaining states in the agreement, which then may have paid 
too high a price for the reduced expected payoffs, under certain conditions 
ex ante states would want to prevent themselves from withdrawing 
prematurely to avoid a net loss. 
We therefore hypothesize that agreements for which one of the goals 
includes solving an underlying commitment problem are more likely to 
have wait periods than those without such a goal. All states will find it in 
their interest to write such a provision, whether they are tying their own 
hands or those of their partner(s) in cooperation who have the commitment 
problem. 
For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
 66. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Bangl.-U.K., June 19, 1980, 
1212 U.N.T.S. 97. 
 67. Background Note: Bangladesh, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 24 2010), http://www.state.gov/ 
r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm. 
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(W-1) Ceteris paribus, agreements that are characterized by an 
underlying commitment problem are more likely to include withdrawal 
wait periods than those not characterized by an underlying 
commitment problem. 
Should states choose to include a withdrawal wait period in their 
agreements, the same reasoning applies to the length of the wait period. 
When states fear their own or another state’s premature withdrawal because 
of the underlying strategic structure that poses short-term incentives to stop 
cooperating, they will want to tie their hands for a longer period. 
For these reasons, we propose the following hypothesis: 
(W-2) Ceteris paribus, if the parties conclude an agreement with a wait 
period, those agreements that are characterized by an underlying 
commitment problem are more likely to feature longer wait periods 
than those not characterized by an underlying commitment problem. 
Thus an underlying commitment problem leads states to include a wait 
period. We are not claiming that it is the only factor that states consider 
when deciding whether to include wait periods or not, but that it is an 
important single factor in their decision-making. Once states decide to 
include a wait period, the underlying commitment problem leads them to 
make the wait period longer. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS68 
A. Data: The Continent of International Law69 
Testing these four hypotheses requires data. To that end, data were 
collected on the characteristics of a random sample of international 
agreements drawn from the United Nations Treaty Series (“UNTS”).70 The 
random sample is conditional on four issue areas: economics, environment, 
human rights, and security. The data collection was informed, both in terms 
of what variables were coded and how they were measured, by Rational 
 
 68. Those wishing to replicate the results should access the “Exit, No Exit” data files available at 
my website. Barbara Koremenos, Research, U. MICH., http://sitemaker.umich.edu/koremenos/research 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2010). 
 69. The Continent of International Law (COIL) research project has been and is currently funded 
by the National Science Foundation (SES-0094376 and SES-0801581). Barbara Koremenos is the 
Principle Investigator. See Koremenos, supra note 9. 
 70. The internet collection at the time the sample was drawn contained over 34,000 international 
agreements, “which have been published in hard copy in over 1,450 volumes, which corresponds to all 
treaties and subsequent actions registered up to December 1986.” See United Nations Treaty Series 
Online Collection, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1. 
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Design theories and by other theoretical approaches in international 
relations.71 
Defining the population of interest represents a crucial first step in any 
sampling exercise, and in this context it meant answering the question of 
exactly what counted as an international agreement. Inclusion criteria were 
developed through an iterative process that included consultation with 
experts in the field, including senior scholars in international relations and 
international law as well as policymakers at the U.S. State Department’s 
Office of Treaty Affairs. 
Essentially, every agreement found in the UNTS was considered an 
international agreement for the purposes of this study unless it was 
excluded by one of the following five rules:72 First, agreements whose 
primary ambition was to either establish the procedures and/or 
arrangements for the goals of negotiations of other agreements, or 
designate the host state of an international conference were excluded. 
Second, agreements not between at least two states were excluded. Thus, 
agreements between one state and an international organization were 
excluded; agreements that are negotiated within an international 
organization but that involve two or more states were included. Third, 
agreements that do not prescribe, proscribe, or authorize behavior that is 
observable in principle were excluded. That is, agreements that are not 
specific enough to include (at least potentially) objective criteria for 
determining performance were excluded from the sample. Fourth, the study 
excluded agreements whose sole ambition is to implement the provisions of 
other international agreements.73 That is, agreements whose terms are 
 
 71. The coding of the dataset COIL incorporated some of the key variables from other core 
theories in International Relations. These include Realism, which theorizes that international institutions 
reflect power relationships between states, see generally, JOHN MEARSHEIMER, TRAGEDY OF GREAT 
POWER POLITICS (2001), and Constructivism, which focuses on how norms can triumph over power 
relations in international institutions and ultimately affect international policy outcomes, see generally, 
M. KECK & K. SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1998). Thus, the COIL data collection featured a question about how symmetric the 
international agreement in question is, with three possible answers: symmetric, mildly asymmetric, and 
profoundly asymmetric. The NPT is an example of a profoundly asymmetric agreement in that its main 
substantive provisions favor powerful actors whereas the International Monetary Fund is an example of 
a mildly asymmetric agreement in that the more wealthy states have greater voting power. To measure a 
variable central to the Constructivist framework, the role of norms, the COIL coding instrument asked 
the coder to identify the balance of prescriptions, proscriptions and authorizations (hard law) and 
recommendations and suggestions (soft law). 
 72. These rules first appear in Koremenos, supra note 9, at 8. 
 73. Rules 3 and 4 derive from Coordination, Reporting and Publication of International 
Agreements, 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(3), (c) (2006). The purpose of that document is to implement the 
provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act. The Case-Zablocki Act calls for the full and timely disclosure to 
the U.S. Congress of all concluded international agreements to which the U.S. is a party. The document 
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closely anticipated and identified in the underlying agreement were 
excluded from the sample. Examples of implementing agreements that 
were included in the sample are those that both implement and extend the 
underlying agreement, those that specify and/or interpret the provisions of a 
vague underlying agreement that would be excluded, and those that 
implement a law of a particular state.74 Fifth, agreements that were 
extended through time, whether by default after the passage of a specified 
duration or by means other than default, were counted only once, not as 
separate international agreements. Renegotiated agreements, on the other 
hand, constituted separate international agreements.75 
The current sample of agreements can be found in the Appendix. It is 
important to note that, by far, the great majority of excluded agreements 
were between one state and an Intergovernmental Organization (“IGO”), 
requiring no judgment calls to be made. Only a couple of agreements were 
excluded under the fourth rule. The Protocol on the construction and 
maintenance of reindeer fences76 between Sweden and Norway was 
excluded because it implements the Agreement between Sweden and 
Norway on the grazing of reindeer;77 the latter agreement calls for the 
construction of fences, but leaves the details concerning placement and 
design for a special agreement. There were no agreements excluded under 
the fifth rule given that extensions and renegotiations of agreements 
counted in the same way the UNTS does. 
A coding instrument was used to record the characteristics of the 
agreements.78 Among the provisions coded were flexibility provisions (e.g., 
Can a subset of states amend the agreement? If so, is it binding on all 
members? Are there certain provisions that states can opt out of but still 
retain membership in the agreement?); membership provisions (e.g., Are 
 
identifies criteria for determining whether any undertaking between the U.S. government or an agency 
of the U.S. government) and another state constitutes an international agreement within the meaning of 
the Act. 
 74. In the 1950s, the United States signed a series of bilateral agreements with its allies, including 
a number of European countries, to implement the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. These bilateral 
agreements are examples of implementing agreements that implement a domestic law of one of the 
parties. See, e.g., Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Relating to Mutual Security, U.S.-
Greece, Dec. 21, 1951 180 U.N.T.S. 2382. 
 75. Agreements that are extended are not considered original agreements in the UNTS. Those that 
are renegotiated, that is, those for which the renegotiated agreement supplants the original agreement, 
are considered original agreements in the UNTS. 
 76. Protocol on the Construction and Maintenance of Reindeer Fences, Nor.-Swed., May 1, 1972, 
968 U.N.T.S. 344. 
 77. Agreement on the Grazing of Reindeer, Nor.-Swed., Feb. 9, 1972, 969 U.N.T.S. 44. 
 78. For a more detailed discussion of the coding instrument, see Koremenos, supra note 9, at 9–
11. 
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there particular member states that must ratify the agreement before it 
enters into force? Are non-state actors given any rights or 
responsibilities?); provisions related to monitoring and compliance (e.g., 
Do states exchange information? Is the information self-reported or 
gathered by an independent agency? Are there penalties for failure to 
comply with agreement provisions?); and references to other international 
agreements. These are just a sprinkling of the characteristics coded. While 
almost 70 percent of the coding instrument was devoted to design issues, 
the remaining questions addressed more substantive issues. For example, 
coders listed the most important prescriptions/proscriptions versus 
recommendations/suggestions. These particular questions will inform a 
study of how international law evolves, including the role of norms, which 
is a hotly debated topic.79 
The coders for this project were extensively trained to ensure that they 
obtained high levels of competency and consistency.80 Two coders 
independently coded each agreement using an online survey instrument. 
After they completed their surveys, an intercoder reliability report was 
generated for the 375 questions for which there are “quantitative” answers, 
like yes/no, multiple choice, or a number.81 (There were an additional 160 
fill-in questions.) The average coded agreement was characterized by 
disagreement on approximately 15 questions, or four percent of the 
quantitative questions; the range was between two and 11 percent. Hence, 
from an intercoder reliability standpoint, these statistics are excellent. The 
inconsistencies were resolved through a close rereading of the agreement 
and supervised discussion involving the original coders, a trained graduate 
student, and Koremenos.82 
 
 79. See Steven R. Ratner, The Trials of Global Norms, 110 FOREIGN POL’Y 65, 65–80 (1998) 
(arguing that international lawyers must begin to acknowledge that in addition to treaties and customary 
law, norms are arising as another important category of law); Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms 
Distinctive?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 669, 701–05 (2000) (arguing for the need for the detailing of 
distinctive features of legal norms so as to understand their effects on international politics). 
 80. The majority of coders went through 9-12 months of course-based training, which included 
both theoretical training and practice coding runs. For further details, see Koremenos, supra note 9, at 
9–11. 
 81. Because building this dataset involved translating qualitative work in the form of international 
agreements into quantitative data, we had to establish that this kind of non-numeric information would 
be quantified the same way regardless of who is quantifying it. An intercoder reliability reports details 
when two people have quantified non-numeric information differently, so that those researchers can 
revisit that information and establish correct quantifications according to definitions set forth in a 
codebook. 
 82. COIL data are featured in several of Koremenos’ articles. See, e.g., Koremenos, supra note 2, 
at 554; Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution 
Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 JOURNAL LEGAL STUD. 189, 194–98 (2007); Barbara 
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B. Dependent Variables 
We operationalize the dependent variables as follows. As defined 
above, a withdrawal notice provision stipulates that a state must give notice 
before it can withdraw from an international agreement; a withdrawal 
notice period is specified as the length of time in months that must pass 
after a state has announced its intention to withdraw before that withdrawal 
can go into effect. A withdrawal wait provision stipulates that a state is 
bound for a certain period of time before it can be free of its international 
obligations; a wait period is the specified length of time in fractional years 
that must pass before a state is completely free of its obligations under the 
agreement—typically, after giving notice and withdrawing. Importantly, 
although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties articulates some 
rules regarding exit, the dependent variables used in this analysis are 
measured according to the agreement text.83 
C. Independent Variables 
Given Rational Design’s focus on the underlying cooperation 
problems that states face as one of the main determinants of institutional 
design, the two independent variables used in the analyses below are an 
underlying enforcement problem and an underlying commitment problem. 
Examples of these variables are given above, but it is important to ask how 
such variables are operationalized for a large-n sample. 
As noted above, two trained coders carefully read the international 
agreement and coded hundreds of institutional design variables. 
Independently, a graduate student with training in rationalist approaches to 
international cooperation and Koremenos also looked at the agreement and 
answered, among others, the following substantive question: How can the 
cooperation problem be characterized? In addition to the independent 
variables elaborated in Rational Design, Koremenos added the following 
possible answers: commitment problem, positive externalities, negative 
externalities, deadlock, and other. (“other” captures areas of cooperation 
such as foreign aid for which there are no or little strategic considerations, 
pure coordination games, and the exportation or codification of norms as in 
the human rights as well as environmental issue area.)84 More than one 
 
Koremenos, When, What, and Why do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 
155–92 (2008). 
 83. See discussion supra note 53. 
 84. Full definitions of these cooperation problems are given in the glossary online. See supra note 
64. 
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answer could be chosen for each agreement since real-life issues are 
characterized by multiple cooperation problems. 
Obviously, these questions are not nearly as straightforward as those 
pertaining to agreement design. Indeed, there is an inference that had to be 
made from the agreement to the cooperation problem. There is no way 
around this in such a study using a random sample of agreements given the 
observations are the agreements themselves and they cut across diverse 
issue and sub-issue areas. Nonetheless, there are some factors that should 
alleviate concerns.85 First, the inference came by looking at relevant 
background information. Sometimes, negotiators reveal the problems they 
were attempting to solve, which is documented. Unfortunately, this was not 
always the case for an agreement from the random sample; rather, research 
needed to be done more broadly on the relationship among the relevant 
states and the general problems of the sub-issue at the time. For example, in 
a bilateral agreement, the relationship of the dyad in the decade or two 
before the agreement is signed was examined. Also, only the substantive 
goals of the agreement were looked at when trying to infer the underlying 
cooperation problem(s). Given that the theoretical work focuses on 
explaining the procedural or design aspects of the agreements, the 
separation of coders for, what are in these analyses, the independent and 
dependent variables was critical to the integrity of the project. This 
approach was extremely labor intensive, but by employing different and 
multiple sets of trained coders, political science and law scholars can have 
confidence in the resulting data. 
In addition to the examples given in the theoretical section above, 
consider the following examples of the two independent variables.86 The 
Agreement Concerning the Protection of the Sound Oresund from 
Pollution87 between Denmark and Sweden in 1974 is coded as having an 
underlying enforcement problem. The assigned coder wrote: “Even though 
there was a significant shadow of the future88 between Denmark and 
Sweden, there were strong economic incentives to defect from the 
agreement: less regulation or wastewater treatment would mean more 
economic freedom for municipalities and more profits for industries. The 
situation was further complicated by the existence of a two-level game 
between the government and industry.”89 
 
 85. This idea draws from Koremenos, supra note 9, at 11. 
 86. These examples first appeared in id. at 11–12. 
 87. Agreement Concerning the Protection of the Sound Oresund from Pollution, Den.-Swed., Apr. 
5, 1974 , 962 U.N.T.S. 205. 
 88. See supra note 56. 
 89. Koremenos, supra note 9, at 12. 
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The Convention on the Protection of Investments signed in 1973 
between France and Mauritius90 was coded as having an underlying 
commitment problem. Drawing on research conducted by a law scholar, the 
coder wrote: “Given its tumultuous history, Mauritius wants to tie its hands 
in case of future regime change so that foreigners will invest.”91  
Thus, each agreement in the sample was coded for every cooperation 
problem as either high—meaning that the underlying problem existed to a 
great degree—or low—meaning the underlying problem existed to a low 
degree. Agreements for which the enforcement problem was coded as high 
received ones while those which were characterized by low enforcement 
problems received zeros; the same coding applied to commitment problem. 
D. Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1-3 present a first glance at the incidence of the variables of 
interest. With a random sample of 142 agreements, some interesting 
findings emerge. Table 1 demonstrates that the incidence of a withdrawal 
clause varies by issue area, with human rights agreement almost always 
incorporating them but more than half of the security agreements in the 
sample failing to do so. Overall, 60% of the agreements contain an exit 
clause. 
Table 1: Withdrawal Clauses: 
Number of Agreements 
Issue Area Have withdrawal 
clause 
Do not have 
withdrawal 
clause 
Economic 39 30 
Environmental 16 9 
Human Rights 20 3 
Security 11 14 
Total 86 56 
 Table 2 illustrates the variation in the length of notice periods of the 
86 agreements in the random sample that have withdrawal clauses. Notice 
periods range from less than one month to twenty-four months, with a 
twelve-month period being the most popular. Other popular notice period 
lengths include 3 months and 6 months. 
 
 90. Convention Concerning the Protection of Investments, Fr.-Mauritius Mar. 22, 1973, 940 
U.N.T.S 309. 
 91. Koremenos, supra note 9, at 12. See generally Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for 
Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107 
(2005) (exploring the relationships and consequences that result from Bilateral Investment Treaties as 
countries pursue treaties as a potential international alternative to domestic institutional protection). 
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Table 2: Length of Notice Periods 
Length of time specified, 
in months 
Number of treaties 
0 1 
1 8 
2 1 
3 12 
4 2 
6 19 
9 1 
12 41 
24 1 
Total 85 
 
Finally, Table 3 illustrates the substantial variation in the withdrawal 
wait periods, for those agreements that include them. While the most 
common wait period is one year or less, the majority of agreements that 
include wait periods specify a period of time greater than one year, with a 
nontrivial number of agreements specifying ten to twenty years. 
 
Table 3: Length of Wait Period 
Length of Wait Period in 
fractional years 
Number of Treaties 
1 year or less 27 
1 to 5 years 17 
5 to 10 years 12 
10 to 20 years 13 
20 to 31 years 14 
Total 83 
Mean 6.88 
Standard Deviation 8.45 
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E. Statistical Results 
To test hypotheses N-1 and N-2 as well as W-1 and W-2, we use both 
probit and Ordinary Least Squares (“OLS”) regressions. Probit enables us 
to examine whether the particular cooperation problems of enforcement 
and commitment make it more likely that states will include notice periods 
and wait periods, respectively. OLS regression enables us to determine the 
effect that these particular strategic problems have on the length of the 
notice and wait periods for those agreements that incorporate them.92 
We also include dummy variables93 for the human rights, economic, 
and environmental issue areas (security is the excluded category) because 
the random sample is conditional on issue area. This is the first theory of 
withdrawal provision variation; no other independent variables are included 
in the model because currently there is no theoretical justification for 
adding them. 
Hypothesis N-1 and N-2 predict that the greater the strategic 
advantage to be gained by a sudden withdrawal (i.e., the presence of an 
underlying enforcement problem), the more likely there is to be a notice 
period as well as a longer notice period. Table 4 shows the results of the 
probit analysis, the marginal effects of the probit analysis, and results from 
the OLS regression.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92. Ordinary Least Squares regression is the most popular estimator amongst researchers: it 
estimates a parameter from data and applies it to data so as to minimize the sum of squared residuals. 
See PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 12–14 (5th ed. 2003). If the outcome of interest (the 
dependent variable) is binomial, a probit model is used to estimate parameters. In this case, the outcome 
of interest – whether or not states include a notice period or a wait period—takes on the value of one 
when the states include such provisions and zero when it does not. For further discussion beginning 
with a review of the mathematical structures of these models, see M. FINKELSTEIN & B. LEVIN, 
STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 350–58, 458–72 (2d 
ed. 2001) for discussions of Ordinary Least Squares and probit models, respectively. 
 93. A dummy variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when something is true 
or is present and 0 when it is not. This variable can provide a useful way to understand how categories 
affect an outcome (for instance, how gender affects a specific outcome or whether the post-Cold War 
world affects an outcome). See FINKLESTEN & LEVIN, supra note 88, at 380, for a further discussion of 
the use of dummy variables in legal studies. 
 94. In Tables 4 and 5, the N values indicate the number of observations used in the analyses. The 
goodness of fit of the models is measured in the R-squared values, which can range from zero to one. A 
zero indicates that the model does not improve prediction over the mean model and a one indicates a 
perfect prediction. 
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 Table 4: Explaining Notice Periods – Probit and OLS results 
 Probit 
Analysis 
Probit Analysis 
Marginal Effects 
OLS Regression 
Enforcement problem 1.57***   .45***   2.82***   
 .34   .06   (.99)   
Human Rights Issue 1.41***    .38***   .89   
 (.45)   .08   (1.67)   
Environment Issue .67*   .22*   .70   
 (.39)   .11 (1.74)   
Economics Issue .26  .10  -1.25  
 (.32)   .12   (1.52)   
Constant -.50 *   
 
7.17 *** 
 (.28)    (1.41)   
N 142 142 85 
R-squared   0.12 
 
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
 
These statistical analyses provide strong support for hypothesis N-1 
and N-2. Having an underlying enforcement problem is significant for 
explaining the notice periods of withdrawal clauses. As the second column 
of Table 4 illustrates, having an underlying enforcement problem increases 
the probability of having a notice period by 45 percent. In the regression 
results, having an underlying enforcement problem increases the length of 
the notice period by 2.82 months, which, given the range of withdrawal 
notice periods described above, is quite large. Moreover, all of these results 
are highly statistically significant. 
Turning to withdrawal wait periods, hypothesis W-1 and W-2 predict 
that agreements with underlying commitment problems are more likely to 
include a wait period than agreements that do not have any potential short-
term losses. Similarly, the short-term losses and long-term gains dynamic 
should increase the length of wait periods for those agreements that 
incorporate them. Table 5 illustrates the results of the probit and OLS 
regressions. 
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 Table 5: Explaining Wait Periods – Probit and OLS results 
 Probit Analysis Probit Analysis 
Marginal Effects 
OLS Regression 
Commitment 
problem 
.75** .26** 13.56***  
 (.32)   (.10)   (1.65)   
Human Rights 
Issue 
1.03*** .33*** 2.77  
 (.40)   (.10)   (2.22) 
Environment Issue .49   .18   3.27   
 (.36 )   (.12) (2.29)   
Economics Issue .05 .02 3.49* 
 (.31)   (.12)   (2.12)   
Constant -.15  .80   
 (.25)    (1.76)   
N 142 142 83 
R-squared    0.55 
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses 
* significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
  
These statistical analyses provide strong support for hypothesis W-1 
and W-2. As the first column in Table 5 illustrates, agreements that are 
characterized by an underlying commitment problem are more likely to 
include a wait period. In fact, the marginal effects column indicates that an 
underlying commitment problem increases the probability of having a wait 
period by 26 percent.95 Finally, when looking at the length of wait periods, 
having a commitment problem plays a very large substantive role in 
determining the length of the period. Having a commitment problem 
increases the length of the wait period by 13.56 years, all else held 
constant. All the effects are highly statistically significant as well. 
 
 95. The marginal effect measures the change in the predicted probability of an event (in this case, 
the inclusion of a wait period) given the values of the explanatory variable (in this case, the presence of 
an underlying commitment problem). See WILLIAM GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 667 (6th ed. 
2008). 
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CONCLUSION 
One of the goals of this Article is to make connections with law 
scholars. Much can be gained from interdisciplinary work which is 
especially important for international relations scholars who, because of the 
subfield’s focus on anarchy, have been somewhat skeptical of international 
law.96 There is no doubt anarchy is important, but if we trumpet it to such a 
large degree, we ignore an entire continent of institutions. Moreover, the 
institutional variation on the international continent is tremendous, with 
differences ranging across multiple dimensions including the rules 
governing membership, voting, monitoring, punishments, disputes, 
delegation, and as this Article shows, even withdrawal. 
When we examine the continent of international law through the 
game-theoretic lens of the underlying cooperation problems states are 
trying to resolve, we expect differences across international agreements and 
institutions. States shape agreements to solve the specific problems they 
face; design variations are largely the result of rational, purposeful 
interactions. The data strongly suggest that the details of withdrawal 
provisions, including the inclusion and length of notice periods and wait 
periods, are rationally designed. Enforcement problems lead to a greater 
incidence of notice periods and longer ones when they are included while 
commitment problems lead to a greater incidence of wait periods and 
longer ones when they are included. The findings of this paper contribute to 
the growing literature on the rational design of international law and 
provide a foundation for further research explaining exit provisions, and 
many other provisions of international agreements. 
 
 96. See generally John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L 
SEC. 5 (1994-95) (arguing that international institutions reflect power relationships and do not 
contribute directly to changes in state behavior or stability of relations between states). There are 
international law scholars who draw similar conclusions. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC 
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that international law’s roles are limited 
since states simply pursue their own interests on the international stage in these venues and law does not 
change the behavior of these states). 
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Appendix: Agreements in Random Sample 
 
TABLE 1 
FINANCE AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories Signature Date UNTS # 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation on the Lake Volta 
Transport System. 
(Federal Rep. Germany – Ghana) 1980 21671 
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. 
(Japan – United Arab Rep.)  1968 10576 
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. 
(Belgium – U.K.)  1953 2526 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation. (Federal Rep. Germany – Congo)  1983 22976 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement. (U.S. – Mexico)  1942 81 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation. (Fed. Rep. Germany – Bangladesh)  1986 25472 
Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. 
(U.K. – Barbados)  1970 10955 
Agreement relating to the purchase by Poland of surplus property 
prior to January 1, 1948. 
(U.S. – Poland)  1946 5851 
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. 
(Australia – Italy)  1982 25393 
Agreement concerning the disposition of certain accounts in 
Thailand under Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan of 8 
September 1951. 
(Multilateral)  1953 2913 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the 
delivery of a linear accelerator to the Cancer Institute. 
(Denmark – India)  1975 14491 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation. 
(Fed. Rep. Germany – 
Cent. Afr. Rep.)  
1984 24332 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation. (Fed. Rep. Germany – Indonesia)  1982 22444 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation. (Fed. Rep. Germany – Niger)  1978 20214 
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. (U.S. – Ecuador)  1956 4114 
Agreement Concerning Financial co-operation. (Fed. Rep. Germany – Thailand)  1981 21732 
Agreement concerning the collection of bills, drafts, etc.  (Multilateral)  1964 8851 
Agreement concerning the compensation of Netherlands interests.  (Netherlands – Egypt)  1971 11868 
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital 
(with protocol). 
(Czechoslovakia – Norway)  1979 18930 
KOREMENOS_FMT5.DOC 1/10/2011  9:51:29 AM 
2010] EXIT, NO EXIT 113 
TABLE 2 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories 
Signature 
Date 
UNTS # 
Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments. (U.K. – Yemen) 1982 22810 
Agreement concerning financial assistance (Federal Rep. Germany – Tanzania) 1974 14366 
Foreign Investment Insurance Agreement. (Canada – Senegal) 1979 24875 
Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments  (U.K. – Panama) 1983 24700 
Convention concerning the mutual promotion and protection of investments. (France – Syrian Arab Rep.) 1978 19570 
Treaty on the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments of 
capital 
(Federal Rep. Germany – Benin) 1978 24681 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to the guaranty of 
private investments. 
(U.S. – Nicaragua) 1959 4922 
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement relating to investment 
guaranties. 
(U.S. – Colombia)  6621 
The Second ACP-EEC Convention (with protocols, final act and minutes of 
the Convention). 
(Multilateral) 1979 21071 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to Canadian investments 
in Western Samoa insured by the Government of Canada through its agent, the 
Export Development Corporation. 
(Canada – Western Samoa) 1978 17730 
Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments. (U.K. – Bangladesh) 1980 19536 
Agreement on the mutual protection of investments (with exchange of notes). (Sweden – China) 1982 22733 
Convention on the protection of investments (France – Mauritius) 1973 13396 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to the guaranty of 
private investments. 
(U.S. – Liberia) 1960 5596 
Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments. (U.K. – Egypt) 1975 15181 
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the guarantees of 
investment securities. 
(New Zealand – Western Samoa) 1970 11642 
Agreement on reciprocal promotion and protection of investments. (France – Equatorial Guinea) 1982 24657 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to guarantees authorized 
by Section 111 (b) (3) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended.
(China – U.S.) 1952 1837 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to investment 
guaranties. 
(U.S. – Zambia) 1966 8901 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to investment 
guaranties. 
(U.S. – Cameroon) 1967 9855 
Agreement on the mutual promotion and guarantee of investments. (Denmark – Romania) 1980 20625 
Agreement on the mutual promotion and protection of investments (with 
exchange of letters) 
(France – Haiti) 1984 24323 
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Convention concerning the encouragement of capital investment and the 
protection of property  
(Netherlands – Tunisia) 1963 7558 
Agreement on processing and protection of investments (with exchanges of 
letters) 
(France – Panama) 1982 24235 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to Canadian investments 
in the Kingdom of Thailand (with related letters). 
(Canada – Thailand) 1983 24956 
Agreement concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of 
investments. 
(Denmark – Sri Lanka) 1985 23607 
TABLE 3 
MONETARY AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories Signature Date UNTS # 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the 
Guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
maintenance of the Minimum Sterling Proportion by the 
Government of Iceland.  
(Iceland – U.K.) 1961 9800 
Agreement concerning settlement of the “Special Yen Problem.”  (Japan – Thailand) 1955 3172 
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the 
Guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
maintenance of the Minimum of Sterling Proportion by the 
Government of Sierra Leone.  
(Sierra Leone – U.K.) 1968 9806 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning the 
Guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
maintenance of the Minimum Sterling Proportion by the 
Government of Libya. 
(Libya – U.K.) 1968 9815 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation.  (Fed.  Rep. of Germany – Somalia) 1983 22962 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation.  (Fed.  Rep. of Germany – Nepal) 1980 21731 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement regarding the 
guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
maintenance of the minimum sterling proportion by Ireland. 
(Belgium - U.K.) 1947 9374 
Exchange of Notes and Monetary Agreement. (Netherlands - U.K.) 1945 24 
Monetary Agreement. (Belgium - U.K.) 1947 367 
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TABLE 4 
TRADE AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories 
Signature 
Date 
UNTS # 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning grain to be 
supplied by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain to the 
Government of Mali within the framework of the Cereals Food Aid 
Programme of the European Economic Community.  
(Mali – U.K.) 1975 14430 
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.  (Dominican Republic – U.S.) 1968 10249 
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.  (Bangladesh – U.S.) 1973 13092 
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.  (Republic of Vietnam – U.S.) 1972 12254 
Supplementary Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.  (Republic of Vietnam – U.S.) 1968 10135 
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.  (Paraguay – U.S.) 1970 11046 
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.  (Egypt – U.S.) 1974 13629 
Agricultural Commodities Agreement under Title I of the Agricultural 
Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (with exchange of 
notes).  
(Republic of China – U.S.) 1960 5579 
International Sugar Agreement, 1973 (with annexes).  (Multilateral) 1973 12951 
Agreement relating to the transfer of agricultural commodities.  (Mozambique – U.S.) 1977 17753 
Agricultural Commodities Agreement under Title I of the Agricultural 
Trade Development and Assistance Act (with agreed minute and 
memorandum of Understanding).  
(Israel – U.S.) 1957 4365 
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities  .  (India – U.S.) 1976 15915 
Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities (with minutes of 
negotiations of 20 March 1978).  
(Lebanon – U.S.) 1978 18143 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning trade in cotton 
textiles (with annex).  
(Mexico – U.S.) 1967 9770 
Agreement concerning economic, scientific and technical co-operation in 
the field of sugar production and sugar by-products (with additional note).  
(Cuba – Mexico) 1979 20684 
Exchange of notes constituting an interim agreement relating to the 
purchase of surplus agricultural commodities.  
(Japan – U.S.) 1954 3239 
Agreement with respect to quality wheat.  (Multilateral) 1962 6389 
Exchange of notes (with annex) constituting an agreement regarding the 
changes which the Government of the United Kingdom propose to 
introduce in their production and trade policies relating to cereals.  
(Argentina – U.K.) 1964 7450 
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TABLE 5 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories Signature 
Date 
UNTS # 
Agreement concerning financial co-operation—Refuse Disposal in the Freetown 
Metropolitan Area.  
(Federal Republic of Germany – Sierra 
Leone) 
1980 21678 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement on the project Soil management and 
conservation in East Amazonia.  
(Brazil – Federal Republic of Germany) 1984 23031 
Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection.  (German Democratic Republic – 
Sweden) 
1976 20644 
 Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection (with agreed 
minutes).  
(Japan – U.S.) 1975 15109 
Agreement concerning the protection of frontier forests against fire.  (Argentina – Chile) 1961   9075 
Community-Cost Concentration Agreement on a concerted action project in the 
field of analysis of organic micro- pollutants in water.  
(Multilateral) 1980 20754 
 Exchange of letters constituting an agreement concerning the free passage of 
salmon in Vanern Lake.  
(Norway – Sweden) 1969 14017 
Agreement for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction 
and their environment.  
(Australia – Japan) 1974 20181 
International Convention (with annexes) for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil.  
 (Multilateral) 1954   4714 
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in earth sciences and 
environmental studies.  
(U.K. – U.S.) 1979 19699 
 Agreement for plant protection— Sudan quelea bird research project.  (Sudan – U.S.) 1977 17308 
European Agreement on the restriction of the use of certain detergents in washing 
and cleaning products.  
(Multilateral) 1968 11210 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas.  
(Multilateral) 1958   8164 
Agreement concerning co-operation in the matter of plant protection.  (Austria – Hungary) 1963   6989 
Agreement for cooperation relating to the marine environment.  (Canada – Denmark) 1983 22693 
Agreement on co-operation in the field of environmental protection.  (U.K. – USSR) 1974 13920 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning land use and soil 
conservation in the eastern Amazon region.  
(Brazil - Federal Republic of Germany) 1979 17973 
Agreement on plant protection and phytosanitary quarantine.  (Bulgaria – United Arab Republic) 1966   9963 
Agreement concerning the protection of the Sound Oresund from pollution.  (Denmark – Sweden) 1974 13823 
African Migratory Locust Convention.  (Multilateral) 1952 10476 
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western 
Hemisphere.  
(Multilateral) 1940 485 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.  (Multilateral) 1969 14097 
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TABLE 6 
HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
Agreement Name Signatories 
Signature 
Date 
UNTS # 
Convention (No. 155) concerning occupational safety and health and the working 
environment.  
(Multilateral) 1981 22345 
Protocol (with annex) amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 
September 1926.  
(Multilateral) 1926 2422 
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.  (Multilateral) 1948 1021 
Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.  
(Multilateral) 1968 10823 
OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa.  (Multilateral) 1969 14691 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  (Multilateral) 1950 2889 
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  (Multilateral) 1966 14668 
Convention on human rights and biomedicine.  (Multilateral) 1997 N/A 
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally 
protected persons, including diplomatic agents.  
(Multilateral) 1973 15410 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.  (Multilateral) 1979 20378 
 Fran-Belgian Agreement on passenger traffic.  (Belgium – France) 1945 132 
Convention (No. 105) concerning the abolition of forced labor.  (Multilateral) 1957 4648 
Agreement on the fundamental rights of nationals.  (Congo – France) 1974 21833 
Protocol relating to refugee seamen.  (Multilateral) 1973 13928 
Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (Multilateral) 1949 972 
Convention (No. 111) concerning discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.  
(Multilateral) 1958 5181 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid.  
(Multilateral) 1973 14861 
Convention (No. 118) concerning equality of treatment of nationals and non-
nationals in social security  
(Multilateral) 1962 7238 
Convention (with Final Protocol) concerning the reciprocal grant of assistance to 
distressed persons.  
(Multilateral) 1951 2647 
Convention (No. 19) concerning equality of treatment for national and foreign 
workers as regards workmen’s compensation for accidents.)  
(Multilateral 1925 602 
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (with Final Act 
and Resolution adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries).  
(Multilateral) 1966   9587 
Convention on fishing and conservation of the living resources in the Baltic Sea 
and the Belts.  
(Multilateral) 1973 16710 
Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution.  (Multilateral) 1979 21623 
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Convention (No. 98) concerning the application of the principles of the right to 
organize and to bargain collectively.  
(Multilateral) 1949 1341 
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization and Agreement on interim 
measures to be taken in respect of refugees and displaced persons.  
(Multilateral) 1946 283 
American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jos, Costa Rica.  (Multilateral) 1969 17955 
Convention (No. 143) concerning migrations in abusive conditions and the 
promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment of migrant workers.  
(Multilateral) 1975 17426 
Convention of establishment.  (France – Mali) 1977 20762 
 
 
TABLE 7 
SECURITY AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
 
Agreement Name Signatories 
Signature 
Date 
UNTS # 
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.  
(Multilateral) 1972 14860 
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.  
(Multilateral) 1980 22495 
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.  
(Multilateral) 1971 13678 
Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic 
offensive arms.  
(USSR – U.S.) 1972 13445 
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques.  
(Multilateral) 1976 17119 
Agreement governing the activities of states on the moon and other celestial bodies.  (Multilateral) 1979 23002 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (with annexed 
Additional Protocols I and II).  
(Multilateral) 1967 9068 
Agreement on the prevention of accidental nuclear war.  (U.K. – USSR) 1977 17086 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to military assistance: Eligibility 
requirements pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.  
(Greece – U.S.) 1976 16035 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to assurances under the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951.  
(Portugal – U.S.) 1952 2799 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.  (Korea – U.S.) 1952 2359 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to military assistance: eligibility 
requirements pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976.  
(Malaysia – U.S.) 1977 17310 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.  (Belgium – U.S.) 1952 2356 
Co-operation Agreement on civil defense and security.  (France – Morocco) 1981 20783 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.  (Luxembourg – U.S.) 1952 2384 
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Security Treaty.  (Japan – U.S.) 1951 1835 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to military assistance: Eligibility 
requirements pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976.  
(Indonesia – U.S.) 1976 16034 
The Security Treaty.  (Multilateral) 1951 1736 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.  (Italy – U.S.) 1952 2365 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.  (Greece – U.S.) 1951 2382 
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement on a defense security arrangement.  (Australia – Netherlands) 1977 21950 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to mutual security.  (Turkey – U.S.) 1952 2361 
Technical Security Arrangement concerning special security measures for safeguarding 
of certain United States classified military articles, services and information.  
(Kuwait – U.S.) 1976 16314 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and Final Act of the Inter-American 
Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security.  
(Multilateral) 1947 324 
Security Agreement concerning certain exchanges of secret information.  (France – Sweden) 1973 14951 
 
 
